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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
We improve upon existing approaches used to estimate investment mod-
els by exploiting tax reforms as "natural experiments." We find that tax
policy has an economically important effect through the user cost of
capital on firms' equipment investment following major tax reforms en-
acted in1962, 1971, 1981,and1986.This effect is most pronounced for
firms not in tax loss positions and, thus, more likely to face statutory tax
rates and investment incentives. We also demonstrate that tax-induced
variation in the user cost of capital across equipment asset classes is
negatively related to asset-specific investment forecast errors following
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major tax reforms, suggesting that ex ante knowledge of an impending
tax reform can improve forecasts of investment.
1. INTRODUCTION
Economists and policy makers have long been interested in the effects of
major changes in tax policy on the level and composition of business
fixed investment. Indeed, many administrations have relied on invest-
ment tax policy as a tool for fiscal stimulus throughout the postwar
period. Following in this tradition, President Clinton included an invest-
ment tax credit as an important component of his first tax proposal.
An informed policy debate requires estimates of the effectiveness of
investment .tax incentives. Providing participants in the tax policy pro-
cess with estimates of the responsiveness of investment to changes in tax
parameters is, however, a difficult task for two reasons. First, there is
considerable debate over the "right" model of investment, complicating
the definition of the theoretical link between tax parameters and the
fundamental determinants of investment (e.g., the user cost of capital,
tax adjusted q, internal funds, etc.). Second, much of the existing empiri-
cal literature is inconclusive (see, e.g., the survey in Chirinko, 1993).
In two papers (Cummins, Hassett, and Hubbard, 1994a,b), we investi-
gate potential econometric problems that might have plagued the past
literature. Employing techniques designed to overcome key confounding
influences, we find that the familiar neoclassical model of investmentin
which investment responds to changes in the net return to investing,
subject to convex costs of adjusting the capital stockdescribes the re-
sponses of business investment to changes in tax policy quite well. The
key feature separating our work from much of the literature is that, in the
past, researchers have relied upon time-series variation in investment
incentives to identify investment models. This approach is appropriate
only if that time-series variation in investment incentives is exogenous to
aggregate investment patterns. A brief inspection of the historical experi-
ence suggests that this is not the case: Policy makers tend to introduce
investment incentives when investment is perceived to be low and re-
move them when investment is perceived to be high (see Cummins,
Hassett, and Hubbard, 1994a).
In our earlier work, we improve upon existing approaches for estimat-
ing these models by using the cross-sectional implications of tax reforms
to identify exogenous shocks to firms' investment conditions. Major tax
reforms offer "natural experiments" for evaluating the responsiveness of
investment to fundamentals affecting the net return to investment be-
cause all assets are not equal in the eyes of the tax authority. Therefore,Have Tax Reforms Affected Investment?133
the effects of tax policy on firms dependupon the types of assets they
purchase; tax reform will produce different investmentincentives for
firms purchasing rapidly depreciating machinery and firmsinvesting in
slowly depreciating property. We argue that this variation islikely to be
exogenous, that is, not depending upon the current level of investment.
Applying our approach, we find that tax policy hasa significant and
large effect on investment. We findvery similar effects across many
different specifications, over many different tax "experiments,"and, in
Cummins, Hassett, and Hubbard (1994b),we find that similar large tax
effects can be found for many other countries.
In this paper, we focus on investment in producers' durableequip-
ment, and extend our earlier work in several directions. First,we allow
for the possibility that firms do not face statutorytax rates and invest-
ment incentives by incorporating tax loss carryforwards intoour analy-
sis.1 Our earlier analysis assumed that all firms inour sample had equal
access to tax benefits. This is, of course, a simplification. Firms whoare
carrying forward tax losses may not claim a credit earned today until
some point in the future. One might argue that these firms shouldre-
spond much less to tax incentives than firms thatare able to claim credits
as they are earned. We believe that identification of this effect isan
important additional test of our methods. Second,we explore the useful-
ness of our estimates for predicting the response of aggregate invest-
ment to shifts in tax policy. If our estimates are "structural," the models'
implied forecasts should provide a reasonableex ante prediction of the
impact of past tax reforms on investment. We explore thispoint in
several ways; in addition to forecasting aggregate values,we use our
parameter estimates to predict out-of-sample compositional effectsof
reforms across different types of capital goods.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews thechannels
through which changes in tax parameters influence theuser cost of
capital for fixed investment, and summarizesour technique for estimat-
ing these effects. In Section 3, we briefly summarize thetax reforms we
intend to study. In Section 4, we present the estimation results obtained
in Cummins, Hassett, and Hubbard (1994a). In Section 5,we extend the
methodology used in Section 4 to account for additional complicationsof
the tax code, in particular the existence of tax-loss asymmetries.In Sec-
tion 6, we use the estimates from the previous sectionto forecast the
changes in outlays in categories of investment goods followingeach of
the major U.S. postwar tax reforms. Wecompare these forecasts to
1See, e.g., the discussions in Auerbach (1986), Auerbach and Poterba (1987),and
Altshuler and Auerbach (1990).134Cummins, Hassett, & Hubbard
actual investment outcomes in order to construct evidenceof the effects
of the major policy changes. Section 7 concludes.
2. MODELING THE RESPONSIVENESSOF
INVESTMENT TO TAX CHANGES
To summarize effects of tax parameters in investmentdecisions, we use
the familiar user cost of capital model.2 In thisformulation, the firm
equates the marginal product of capital and theshadow price of capital,
C:
p(l -(p + 6it - II
\p(1-1'iJ,/!
/ 7(Pt+i(1 - F+)) \S\
(1) ci,t 1 - Tt
where i and t are the firm and time indices,respectively; p is the price of
capital goods relative to output; p is the firm'sreal required rate of
return;is the rate of economic depreciation; zis the difference opera-
tor; T is the corporate tax rate; and F is the presentvalue of tax savings
from depreciation allowances and other investmentincentives. For exam-
ple, with an investment tax credit at rate k:
k-(1 + r6 + T) - t), (2)
s=t
where r is the default risk free real rate of interest, ir' isexpected infla-
tion, and D1,(a) is the depreciation allowance permitted anasset of age a.
The definition of the user cost of capital in Equation (1)makes clear
that permanent changes in tax parameters can have asignificant effect
on the user cost of capital. We nowoutline an approach to estimate the
responsiveness of investment to the user cost of capital.Following our
(1994a) paper, we begin by considering the following generalmodel of
investment:
= E1,_(S1) y + jt (3)
2 The user cost approach follows the seminal contributions of Jorgenson (1963) andHall
and Jorgenson (1967). The setup we use follows a generalizationof their work that includes
costs of adjustment; see, for example, Auerbach (1989)and Abel (1990).Have Tax Reforms Affected Investment?135
where I and K denote investment and the capital stock, respectively; S is
an underlying structural variable (e.g., the user cost of capital) or set of
variables; E,_1 is the expectations operator conditionalon information
available at time t - 1; and e is a white noise error term reflecting
optimization error by firms.
We treat expected S as observable following major tax reforms,so that,
in principle, we may rewrite Equation (3) during those periodsas:
I
K1= sity +
Given Equation (4), the deviation of (I/K) from the value linearly predict-
able using information available at time t- 1 is:
P_1 (Si, - y + (5)
where P is a projection operator constructed from a nontax subset of the
firm's information set.
To construct an estimator, we make the identifying assumption that
near a tax reform we can observe expected S. in principle including
the nontax elements. To avoid introducing simultaneity bias into the
second-stage regression, we assume that the firm's expected value for
each nontax component of S equals its value at the beginning of the
previous period. For example, for the case of the Tax Reform Act of
1986, we impose the assumption that the expected interest rate in
1987 was the year-end rate for 1985. To avoid confounding timing
issues, we sidestep years in which tax changes occurred. Returning to
the example of the 1986 Act, we estimate a first-stage projectionequa-
tion for each firm through 1985, and then construct forecasts for 1987,
the first postreform year.
Returning to the model in Equation (3), and incorporating quadratic
adjustment costs to the firm's profit function, one can show that current
investment depends on current and future expected values of theuser
cost of capital (see, e.g., Auerbach, 1989). That is, a firm's investment
rule is given by:
I.= /.L + E_[E + (6)
1xi,t1
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where 4 and cv are technology parameters depending on adjustment
costs and the long-run average of the user cost term, and c isdefined as
in equation (1).3 The subscripts i and s recognize that components of c
vary across firms and time.
If we assume, for simplicity that firms believe that a major tax reform
is "permanent," then all future values of c are equal, so the expression
may be simplified, producing a convenientsubstitute for S in Equations
(3) and (4). It is this version that we investigate below.
3. BUSINESS TAX REFORMS
Our earlier work focused on using periods following tax reforms to
estimate the cross-sectional relationship between firm investment and
measures of the net return to investing (inparticular, tax-adjusted q and
the user cost of capital). Our focus is on "major reforms" that changed
tax incentives for investment significantly and wereexpected to be long-
lasting.
There were 13 arguably significant changes in the corporate tax code
during the period we consider, beginning with the Kennedy tax cut in
1962 and ending with the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Before explaining the
details of each change, it is useful to provide an overview of the trend in
the corporate tax burden. The statutory corporate tax rate was reduced
steadily from 52 percent in 1962 to 34 percent in 1988 except from 1968 to
1971, when a surcharge was imposed. The investment tax credit was
first enacted January 1, 1962, and was in effect through the end of 1986,
except for two periods from October 10, 1966, to March 9, 1967, andfrom
April 19, 1969, to August 15, 1971. The credit was increased three times,
and the number of assets eligible for the credit has expanded. Deprecia-
tion allowances became more generous, culminating in the Accelerated
Cost Recovery System introduced by the Economic Recovery Tax Actof
1981, but they were subsequently limited by the Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1982, which introduced the Modified Accelerated
Cost Recovery System.
A more complete description of the tax reforms is as follows: The Ken-
nedy tax cut introduced an investment tax credit for most types of equip-
ment. The effective rate was generally 4 percent. The Revenue Actof 1964
lowered the corporate tax rate from 52 percent to 50 percent for 1964, and
from 50 percent to 48 percent for 1965. The 1964 Act also modified the
investment tax credit so that the credit was no longer deducted from the
See the derivations in Auerbach (1989), Auerbach and Hassett (1992), and Cummins,
Hassett, and Hubbard (1994a).cost of the asset before computing depreciation for tax purposes, effec-
tively doubling the benefit of the ITC. The investment tax creditwas then
suspended in 1966. The Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968
introduced a corporate income tax surcharge of 10 percent. The invest-
ment tax credit was reinstated in 1969. In 1970, the surcharge was reduced
to 2.5 percent, and the investment tax credit was eliminated. Thesur-
charge was removed for 1971. For 1972, the investment tax creditwas
reintroduced, and the first major liberalization of depreciation allowances
was enacted. Asset lives were shortened through the asset depreciation
range (ADR) system. If one takes these changes together, the effective
credit rate was generally about 7 percent. The creditwas temporarily
increased to 10 percent in 1975. In 1979, the corporate tax ratewas lowered
from 48 percent to 46 percent, and the temporary increase in the invest-
ment tax credit was made permanent. The Economic Recovery and Tax
Act of 1981 provided the second major liberalization of depreciation allow-
ances. It replaced the numerous asset depreciation classes with three
capital recovery classes. Light equipment was written offover three years,
other equipment over five years, and structures over 15years. The reduc-
tion was modified one year later by repealing the accelerations in the
writeoff that were to occur in 1985 and 1986, and instituteda basis adjust-
ment of 50 percent for the credit. As a result, the effective rate wasgener-
ally about 8 percent. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 reduced the corporatetax
rate to 40 percent in 1987 and to 34 percent in 1988, and eliminated the
investment tax credit.
Our specific criteria for identifying "major reforms"were: (1) the value
of the tax wedge in the user cost of capital (that is, (1- F)) must have
changed in absolute value by at least 10 percent, (2) no tax shift of that
magnitude occurred in either the preceding or succeedingyear, and (3)
the reforms were unanticipated in the year prior to the reform. Using
these criteria, we identified as major tax reforms the set of tax changes
occurring in legislation enacted in 1962, 1971, 1981, and 1986.
We illustrate the effects of tax reforms on investment incentives in
Figures 1 and 2. The time-series variation in investment incentives is
evident in Figure 1, which plots a representative tax wedge, (1- F), for
equipment over the period from 1953 to 1989. Figure 2 introduces the
added dimension of cross-sectional variation in the tax wedgeacross asset
classes, plotting (1 - F) by equipment asset class (using the 22 equip-
ment classes measured by the Commerce Department's Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis, BEA) in each period. As the changing distribution of tax
incentives in Figure 2 illustrates, tax reforms are associated not only
The tax wedge shown is for special industrial machinery.



























FIGURE 1. After-Tax Cost of $1 of Investment: Equipment.
1990
1989
FIGURE 2. After-Tax Cost of $1 of Equipment Investment: BEA Assets
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with increases or decreases in the average level of investment incentives,
but also with shifts in the distribution of investment incentives across
equipment assets. It is this cross-sectional shift in response to tax re-
forms that we exploit in our empirical work.
RESULTS FROM EARLIER WORK
Estimates of the user cost model (Equation [5]) based on firm-level data
on equipment investment using firm-level data5 are presented in Table
1. The first row of Table 1 reports results for the year following the first
major tax reform in our sample, 1962.6 The estimated coefficient on the
user cost of capital (-0.605) is negative and statistically significant. Since
the mean for the user cost and the ratio of investment to capital are
approximately equal in our sample, this estimate implies that a 10-
percent decrease in the user cost of capital will increase the equipment
investmentcapital ratio by about 6 percent. The next three rows report
our base-case estimates for the years following subsequent major tax
reforms. In each case we find very similar results: The coefficient on the
cost of capital is negative and statistically significant, and implies an
elasticity of investment with respect to the user cost between 0.6 and
0.75.
FIRM TAX STATUS AND THE USER COST
In the previous section, we assumed that the firm choosing the level of
investment could claim the tax benefits of investment at the time that the
investment is being made. This assumption is clearly inaccurate for firms
that carry forward tax losses.8 For these firms, any tax benefits accrued
The dataset and procedures for constructing variables are summarized in the Appendix.
6These estimated coefficients do not change qualitatively if lagged cash flow (relative to
beginning-of-period capital stock) is added as an explanatory variable.
If one assumes an average value of the user cost coefficient of 0.7 and an average user
cost of 0.25, the implied cost of adjustment per dollar of equipment investment is about 30
cents. This estimated adjustment cost is significantly lower than that estimated in many
earlier empirical studies (see, e.g., Summers, 1981; Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen, 1988).
The potential empirical significance of firms in tax loss positions has been established by
Cordes and Sheffrmn (1983) and Auerbach and Poterba (1987). Modeling directly the effects
of tax-loss carryforwards is difficult, however, as assumptions about the earnings process
and effects of firm decisions on carryforward positions are required (see, e.g., Auerbach,
1986; Auerbach and Poterba, 1987). Moreover, accounting measures of tax-loss carry-
forwards in Compustat do not correspond precisely to measures in federal corporate
income tax returns, and the incidence of tax losses in Compustat may not summarize well
the incidence of tax losses for firms generally.140Cummins, Hassett, & Hubbard
TABLE 1.
Estimates of User Cost Model, Major Tax Reform Years
Notes: t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the point estimates. The number of firms is reported
in parentheses under each year. Estimates are based on the analysis of Compustat data in Cummins,
Hassett, and Hubbard (1994a).
today just add to the stock of tax benefits being carried forward. The
value of, say, an investment tax credit depends upon how far into the
future the firm expects to have to wait before claiming the credit accrued
in the current period. Strictly speaking, then, the estimated effect of the
user cost of capital on investmentusing the technique described earlier
and grouping we have used in our earlier workmay be biased down-
ward, since we ignored in previous work the important heterogeneity
introduced by differences in tax status. In this section, we extend our
previous work, testing for important differences in the responsiveness
to investment fundamentals between firms that are in a tax loss position
(and currently paying no federal corporate income taxes) and those that
are not. We view this exercise as an important additional testof the
validity of our results.
Table 2 reports the results of this experiment for each of the major tax
reforms described in Section 4 except that for 1962. (We do not report
results for this reform, since we had almost no firms in our sample in a tax
loss position at that time.) We present the estimated effect of the user cost
These concerns, while important, are not serious for the exercise presented here. We are
using the tax loss carryforward status only as a signal of a firm's ability to claim tax credits:
Sample splitting based upon prior information does not require a "perfect" measure of the
existing stock of tax losses. Our split might not be informative if firms enter and exit tax
loss status frequently. Studying the period from 1968 through 1984, Auerbach and Poterba
(1987) find significant persistence in tax loss status, however. If our measure of tax loss
status does not accurately depict the true conditions for the firms in our sample, then we
should expect to see little difference between our sets of firms in the responsiveness of
investment to the user cost of capital.
As with Table 1, these estimated coefficients are not qualitatively different when lagged
cash flow (relative to beginning-of-period capital stock) is added as a regressor.
1963 0.078 0.605 0.145
(N = 107) (2.72) (4.21)
1973 0.024 0.546 0.057
(N = 267) (1.32) (4.00)
1982 0.047 0.757 0.032
(N = 469) (5.06) (3.89)
1987 0.013 0.747 0.022
(N = 549) (.736) (3.32)
Year Constant User cost of capitalHave Tax Reforms Affected Investment?141
TABLE 2.
Estimates of User Cost Model By Tax Loss Status, Major Tax Reform
Years
No tax loss carryforwards Tax loss carryforwards
Note: t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the point estimates. The number of firms in each
category is reported in parentheses in each year. The estimation technique is discussed in the text and is
based on Cummins, Hassett, and Hubbard (1994a).
of capital on investment for firms with and without tax loss carryforwards
in the year prior to our period of estimation. The pattern of the estimated
coefficients presented in Table 2 is intuitively appealing: Within the sub-
set of firms that can claim any investment incentives in the current year,
the estimated coefficient is larger than in our original sample. (The esti-
mated user cost coefficients are - 0.656, 1.021, and 1.70, in the three
reforms, respectively.) In addition, we find no evidence that firms with
tax loss carryforwards respond to changes in the tax components of the
user cost. In particular, the estimated user cost coefficients are 0.266,
0.303, and 0.698, respectively, in the three reforms; none of these esti-
mated coefficients is significantly different from zero. This lack ofrespon-
siveness makes sense if firms expect to have to wait many years before
they can claim any tax benefits.1° Three results suggest that, in order to
predict the effects of changes in investment tax policy, one will have to
control explicitly for the percentage of firms that are expected to be ina tax
loss position. Among those firms that are not, we find that the (absolute
value of the) elasticity of the investment capital ratio with respect to the
user cost of capital may even be larger than unity.11 In addition, this split
10We cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficients are the same for firms with and
without tax loss carryforwards. This is because the standard errors of the estimates for the
former group of firms are very large.
11An important additional consideration that we do not address here is the alternative
minimum tax (AMT). Firms on the AMT face significantly different marginal investment
incentives and, thus, may respond differently than firms not on the AMT. This difference
may be of increasing importance in the early 1990s. Unfortunately, data limitations make






19730.0390.656 0.131 0.0050.266 0.097
(-3.28) (-6.21) (N = 247)(-0.110)(-1.43) (N = 20)
19820.0591.02 0.020 0.1180.303 0.010
(-2.63)(-2.84)(N = 440)(-1.18) (-0.189)(N = 29)
1987 0.0201.71 0.024 0.082 0.698 0.005
(1.04) (-3.61)(N = 495)(-1.60) (0.529)(N = 54)142Cummins, Hassett, & Hubbard
provides additional evidence that adjustment costs may be much lower
than previous work has suggested. Our largest estimated coefficients are
consistent with adjustment costs roughly equal to 15 cents for each dollar
of investment.
Finally, it is worth noting that the overall fit of our equations remains
low. This suggests that there may be very important omitted variables
(e.g., shocks to firms' demand). Our sensitivity analysis suggests that
these omitted variables are uncorrelated with the cross-sectional varia-
tion in marginal tax rates; if they were not, our results would be sensitive
to inclusion of other firm fundamentals. Thus, our estimates of the likely
effects of taxes are not invalidated by the low R2. On the other hand,
investment is a highly volatile variable, and observation of tax effects
after tax reforms may be difficult if many other things are changing at the
same time. We return to this point in our forecasting discussionbelow.
6. OTHER AGGREGATE EVIDENCE
In this section, we explore further the plausibility of the substantial
effects of tax reforms on investment documented in the previous sec-
tion. The evidence suggests that forecasts of aggregate investment, ad-
justed to include tax effects, perform better than forecasts that exclude
tax effects. We demonstrate this in an intuitive manner by using vector
autoregressions to forecast investment for each of BEA's 22 classes of
equipment investment in the year following a tax reform, and then
compare the forecast errors for each of the assets to thechanges in the
user cost for that asset.12 In Figures 3-6 (one for eachmajor tax reform),13
we provide plots of these forecast errors constructedfrom models that
exclude taxes against shocks to the user cost of capital for each of the 22
equipment asset classes tracked by the BEA. In addition, we draw a
12The VAR regressions are run separately for each asset, and, in addition, two auto-
regressive terms include lags of aggregate output and the six-month Treasury-bill rate. The
capital stock data are from the BEA, and are described more fully in Cummins, Hassett,
and Hubbard (1994a). For the 1962 experiment, we used only the AR(2) terms because of
the very short pre-reform sample period, which reduced the degrees of freedom for the
forecasting runs.
13There is a difference between the years we report in the "asset experiments" (1962, 1973,
1981, and 1987) and those we report in the "firm" experiments (1963, 1973, 1982, and 1987).
This is because the asset data are calculated on a calendar year basis, while the firm data
are calculated on a fiscal-year basis. We have chosen the "experiment" year withthis
difference in the data definitions in mind. As a result, when a tax change occurs relatively
early in a year, the asset data will show a response in that year. In contrast, firm data wifi
report much of the change in the next fiscal year. Consider, for example, the Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981. While the legislation passed on July 31, 1981, the 1982 fiscal year











































FIGURE 3. Cross-Sectional Relationship Between Investment and
User Cost Forecast Errors: 1987.
FIGURE 4. Cross-Sectional Relationship Between Investment and
User Cost Forecast Errors: 1981.
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FIGURE 6. Cross-Sectional Relationship Between Investment and
User Cost Forecast Errors: 1962.
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regression line through the scatterplot. The idea is that the forecast
errors for investment should be negatively correlated with the forecast
errors for the user costs of capital if tax parameters are having the effects
suggested by our estimates in Section 3.
These plots suggest a number of points. First, the downward-sloping
line in each of the charts indicates a clear negative correlation, although
the strength of the correlation varies somewhat across years. In particu-
lar, the correlation in 1981a recession year wherein many other forces
were presentappears to be weakest, whereas the correlation in 1987 is
the strongest. In all cases, however, the pattern of the two errors suggest
that prior knowledge of changes in tax parameters can improve forecasts
of asset investment. The second important lesson from the charts is that,
while the movements of investment for the individual series are consis-
tent with the predictions of the neoclassical model, a significant amount
of the variation across assets is not explained. This should come as no
surprise; taxes are not the only thing changing, even in the tax reform
years.
Our tax results are to some extent reassuring: A key fundamental vari-
able that alters the marginal tradeoffs for investors is highly correlated
with changes in investment. Our forecasting figures suggest, however,
that tax parameters are only a piece of the puzzle, and predicting the
impact of tax reform on investment remains a formidable task. Consider,
for example, the constant terms in our estimated models. These capture
the average "year effect" and are an indicator of the total effect on invest-
ment of all other changes in fundamentals in a given year. In almost all of
our experiments, this year effect is very statistically significant and as
important in magnitude as changes in tax policy. For tax reforms occur-
ring during recessions, for example, the year effect may work in the
opposite direction of the tax reform, that is, investment is lower than
would have been forecast in the prior year, even though an investment tax
credit was enacted. This simply reflects the fact that investment is volatile.
For our sample period, using our "large"compared with the past
literatureestimated user cost coefficients, the mean absolute predicted
effect of a tax reform on the ratio of investment to the capital stock is about
0.01.14 Over our sample period, the mean of the investment-to-capital
ratio is about 0.2, and the standard deviation is 0.04. Thus, the standard
error of investment is roughly four times as large as the typical effect of a
tax reform. While, all else equal, our estimates provide a clue about the
14 This calculation assumes that tax reforms are unanticipated. The effects of temporary
reforms, if anticipated, can be quite large, since they provide incentives to bunch invest-
ment in the periods where the best tax benefits are available.146Cummins, Hassett, & Hubbard
responsiveness of investment to tax-induced changes in the user cost of
capital, all else is seldom equal, and analysts should proceed cautiously
when attempting to evaluate potential policy actions using our results.
7. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we find that tax policy had an economically important
effect through the user cost of capital on firms' equipment investment
following major tax reforms enacted in 1962, 1971, 1981, and 1986. This
effect is most pronounced for firms not in tax loss positions and, thus,
more likely to face statutory tax rates and investment incentives. We also
demonstrate that tax-induced variation in the user cost of capital across
equipment asset classes is negatively related to asset-specific investment
forecast errors following major tax reforms. This correlation is consistent
with the standard neoclassical model, and suggests that ex ante knowl-
edge of an impending tax reform can improve forecasts of investment.
APPENDIX: FIRM-LEVEL DATA AND ESTIMATION
The data set used to generate the results in Tables 1 and 2 is a 36-year
(1953-1988) unbalanced panel of firms from the Compustat Industrial
data base. Compustat data are reported in 20-year waves, so the 1989 file
is combined with the 1973 file to make a continuous panel. Variable
definitions are standard except for our measure of the user cost of capi-
tal. We exploit additional firm level information in Compustat to con-
struct more precise estimates of the user cost of capital and to add to the
cross-sectional variation in the panels.
The variables used are defined as follows: Gross investment is the sum
of the change in the net stock of property, plant and equipment and in
depreciation. Gross equipment investment (used in estimating the user
cost of capital model) is the change in the net stock of machinery and
equipment grossed up by the estimated firm-specific rate of equipment
depreciation (estimated as in Cummins, Hassett, and Hubbard, 1994a).
The investment variables are divided by the values of their own
beginning-of-period capital stocks. Where appropriate, variables are de-
flated by the implicit price deflator for gross domestic product.
We experimented with including additional macroeconomic variables
as first-stage instruments. These included the price of investment goods,
oil prices, and various interest rates (available from Citibase). We found
that including additional variables had little impact on the results. For
the reported results, we use the most parsimonious specification, includ-
ing only lags of investment, cash flow, and a time trend.Have Tax Reforms Affected Investment?147
There are several data construction issues that merit attention. The
number of firms in the panel decreases in 1971. The Compustat Indus-
trial file reports data only for those firms still in existence at the end of
the 20-year reporting period. As a result, in 1971, the year in which the
1989 file begins, there are firms included in the old wave but not in the
new wave. We chose to retain those firms to avoid deleting data from
our relatively small beginning-of-period panels, excluding those firms
that did not significantly affect the results. Additional difficulties arise in
using equipment data. Data on the gross stock of equipment capital are
first reported in 1969. In order to construct the gross stock of equipment
capital before 1969, we multiply the firm's gross stock of property, plant,
and equipment by its two-digit SIC code, year-by-year share of equip-
ment in gross capital stock as reported by the BEA. As a result, the
number of firms reported in the equipment investment models de-
creases in 1969, the point we begin using data on gross investment
instead of calculating it.
We make two significant improvements in the construction of the user
cost of capital. First, we construct firm-specific depreciation rates rather
than using the one-digit SIC code depreciation rates constructed with
Hulten and Wykoff (1981) depreciation data combined with aggregate
capital stock weights (see Cummins, Hassett, and Hubbard, 1994a). Sec-
ond, for our user cost of capital experiments, we construct a firm-specific
required rate of return using Compustat data on firms' interest expense
and total long-term and short-term debt.15 These changes necessarily
introduce measurement error. Despite this, we believe that the benefits
of better capturing firm-specific investment incentives outweigh the cost
of increased measurement error.16
Firm data were deleted or modified according to the following rules. If
the estimated firm depreciation rate is negative or greater than unity, we
set it equal to the mean for firms in the same four-digit SIC code. If the
estimated interest rate is above 25 percent, we also set it equal to the
mean for firms in the same four-digit SIC code. If the replacement value
of the capital stock or inventory is estimated to be negative, we set it
equal to book value. If dividend payouts on preferred stock are reported
15We experimented with using Compustat data on the firms' S&P debt rating and bond
rating as measures of the real interest rate firms face. We opted to use the method above
because Compustat reports those data items only from 1978 onward. We believe the class
of debt and bond rating may provide a better measure of a firm's real interest rate but did
not find that using either measure in our sample after 1978 significantly improved our
results.
16Estimates of models with a fixed real required rate of return of 4 percent produced
virtually identical results.148Cummins, Hassett, & Hubbard
as missing, we set them equal to zero. If no inventory valuation method
is specified, we assume the firm used the FIFO system. If multiple varia-
tion methods are reported, our calculations assume that the primary
method is used.
We delete observations if the ratio of investment to the beginning-of-
period capital stock is greater than unity. We also delete observations if
the ratio of cash flow (or net income) to the beginning-of-period capital
stock is greater than 10, in absolute value. These two rules delete obser-
vations that represent especially large mergers, extraordinarily firm
shocks, or Compustat coding errors. They delete fewer than 5 percent of
the firms used in first-stage estimation. Finally, we delete observations
whose forecast errors from the first-stage are more than 20 times higher
than the mean forecast error. These large forecast errors typically occur
when there are very few observations for the firm so that forecasting is
very imprecise. Again, these rules usually delete a very small fraction of
the data (for about 1 percent of the firms, and never more than 5 per-
cent). The results are not sensitive to which specific cutoff values are
used.
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